To succeed in the product development market today, firms must quickly and accurately satisfy customer needs while designing products that adequately accomplish their desired functions with a minimum number of failures. When failure analysis and prevention are coupled with a product's design from its conception, potentially shorter design times and fewer redesigns are necessary to arrive at a final product design. In this article, we explore the utility of a novel design methodology that allows FMEA-style failure analysis to be conducted during conceptual design. The Function-Failure Design Method (FFDM) guides designers towards improved designs by predicting likely failure modes based on intended product functionality.
INTRODUCTION
A company specializing in electric power transformers rolls out a new high capacity transformer.
Knowing that the high electricity handling capabilities of this new transformer will necessitate increased heat transferring capacity, the designers add large horizontal cooling fins to the sides of the transformer case. However, shortly after installation, the transformers begin to fail due to overheating after the oil used to cool them leaks out of the casings through cracks that develop at the welded connection points of the cooling fins. It is determined that the cracks developed due to fatigue stresses induced during
shipping. [1] If the designers of these transformers had been more aware of the common failures that befall large heat transferring components, is it likely that these failures could have been avoided? In this paper we report on a method and its potential in preventing costly problems like the one discussed above with emphasis on addressing failures at the functional level.
The research presented here is motivated by two engineering maxims: 1) Design organizations seek to derive a successful design solutions with minimal effort; 2) The less likely that a failure will occur within a product's life cycle, the more the consumer will appreciate it.
The methodology presented here seeks to capitalize on these two maxims by keeping the designer(s) of a new product cognizant of failure modes during the function definition stage of design. The Function-Failure Design Method (FFDM) offers a new approach for coupling failure analysis with product design during the conceptual stage. The research builds upon the function-failure method developed by Tumer and Stone [2] , which allows for historical failure data to be collected and related to the failed artifact's functionality. These relations are used to build knowledge bases of past failures that can be used by designers to avoid these failures in future designs. Like other expert systems development efforts, a considerable amount of work is involved in developing the knowledge base on the part of researchers. The function-failure analysis method was developed and tested using household products in Arunajadai et al. [3] and using NTSB rotorcraft accident data in Roberts et al. [4] . Research using spacecraft historical problem and failure data is also currently underway to develop a comprehensive function-failure knowledge base for NASA missions [5] . In this paper, the function-failure analysis approach is formalized specifically to address the issue of conceptual design, and extended to combine with a concept generator approach [6] to develop new designs with fewer failures.
At this point, several basic characteristics of the FFDM are noted below in order to describe in general terms the capabilities and performance of the method developed in this 3 work in comparison with other relevant techniques as shown in Table 1 .
Since CFMA, AFMEA, and WIFA are all closely related to FMEA in approach, these are collectively referred to as FMEA type approaches. A more complete discussion of these other methods is given in the Section 2. 
Many advantages can be gained by beginning the failure analysis of a new design at the conceptual design stage and in particular during functional design. The main advantage comes from arriving at a more reliable product without the need for multiple redesigns in order to eliminate failure modes in advanced stages of the design process, as happens in the traditional FMEA approach. FFDM as well as FLAME and WIFA derive potential failures based on historical data in a knowledge base rather than through direct human recollection as in the FMEA type processes. As a result the FFDM approach requires less overhead in terms of personnel when performing an analysis. Unfortunately this knowledge base comes at a price due to the logistics of populating the knowledge base with relevant data. For techniques not using a knowledge base, this information ultimately is still necessary although it is maintained as personal knowledge by the engineering team or as other documented forms of corporate or general knowledge such as best practices, standards, and processes. In either case however, 4 design reviews with an appropriate team of engineers is still required to ensure that potential failures do not fall through the cracks of a given failure method.
Furthermore, the FFDM is currently missing some of the analysis that is present within FMEA approaches. The FFDM does not diagnose or address the "cause" of failure modes nor does it have any conditions for manufacturability. Archiving historical failure "causes" and manufacturing problems in knowledge bases similar to the function-failure knowledge base could address both of this deficiencies. These knowledge bases could then be integrated into the FFDM, allowing the designer to use this historical data to guide their design as well. The FFDM is also currently devoid of analysis that would be analogous to the severity and detectability rankings that are present within FMEA methods. As the function-failure knowledge base grows and is refined, this information will be added and will then be accessible with the FFDM. With respect to failure interactions, the FFDM can identify failures that tend to occur together using similarity matrices. This particular aspect is not addressed here, but it is covered in previous papers [2, 7] One key advantage of FFDM and certain others is they can be utilized during the functional stage of design without the need for any physical solution choice. A consequence of this benefit is that potential failures can be identified and addressed in the functional model.
Specifically, this allows a designer an opportunity to add, change, or delete functionality so that the identified potential failures can be addressed before the design progresses to embodiment design tasks. Of course, certain failures may not be avoided by this change in functionality.
In this light, the paper first reviews related research and background of the functionfailure analysis and the function-failure knowledge base required for the analysis in Section 2.
In Section 3, an example function-failure knowledge base and its development are shown.
Then, a formalized methodology and general guidelines for using the methodology in conjunction with a concept generator method are presented in Section 4. An evaluation of the FFDM is covered in Section 5 which includes both a broad assessment and a systematic method 5 evaluation. A discussion of the method followed by recommendations and future work round out this paper.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED RESEARCH

Background: Traditional Failure Analysis in Design
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been the industry standard failure analysis method for many years and therefore serves as a reasonable benchmark for comparing other failure analysis techniques. Originally developed from the US military standard MIL-P-1629A [8] , FMEA has been widely tested and enhanced by many organizations, most notably the United States' auto manufacturers. In a joint undertaking by Chrysler, Ford, General
Motors and the Automotive Industry Action Group a reference manual for conducting FMEA was published in 1993 [9] . This manual was intended to guide the FMEA activities of these companies and their suppliers. Despite this effort to formalize a single FMEA procedure, there are still many different methods for undertaking an FMEA analysis. Another shortcoming of FMEA methods is that they are not well suited for the conceptual design of a product, since details of the physical design are rarely known [10] . This leads to time-consuming redesigns that must also be evaluated with FMEA methods, leading to even longer total design times.
Also, the FMEA procedure requires the input of a concurrent engineering team of five to nine cross-functional and multi-disciplinary individuals [11] , thus making it not only time consuming, but also quite expensive. In industry, "engineers consider FMEA to be laborious and time-consuming (and thus expensive) to carry out" [12] .
Wirth et al. [12] state that FMEA has two fundamental weaknesses: the lack of methodological guideline and the use of natural language. The AIAG manual [9] has addressed the lack of a methodological guideline for conducting FMEA, but it is still common for FMEA practices to vary between different fields, companies and even FMEA teams. Nevertheless, this analysis at least yields some information about these metrics while the FFDM method only returns output for the failure mode.
Attempts have been made to modify FMEA for use in conceptual design. Hari and
Weiss [10] have developed a failure analysis method known as CFMA that uses an FMEA-style analysis on the functional representation of a design. CFMA is a step toward bringing failure analysis to the front end of design, but continues to use the natural language for describing functions and subsequent subjectivity of traditional FMEA methods. While the failure modes for CFMA are described in terms of form rather than function, the CFMA process is driven by consideration of concept functionality. Similarly, the Advanced FMEA (AFMEA) method of Kmenta et al. [13] is a system design failure analysis method that is based on a behavior model that includes both the functionality and physical entities of a design solution. This functional dependence allows AFMEA to be performed in the early stages of system design yet AFMEA is 7 operationally similar to FMEA and the method relies on a design personnel rather than a type of expert system for identifying failures.
In electrical design, there have been attempts to undertake FMEA-like failure analysis at the conceptual design stage. The FLAME System [14, 15] links its failure analysis to a functional model derived during conceptual design. In FLAME, the functional models are embodied by
components from an extensive library. The embodied representations are then subjected to a computer simulation in order to see the effect of a list of possible failures within the new design. 
Related Research: The Function-Failure Analysis and Knowledge Base
A critical part of the FFDM method is a required knowledge base of previous products.
The approach in this research is to utilize a matrix based approach that derives potential failures through a series of matrix multiplications that relate functions to failures through an association of i) functions to components and subsequently ii) components to failures. In particular, the designer simply needs a function-component (EC) and a component-failure (CF) matrix. The end goal of a function-failure knowledge base, designated as the function-failure (EF) matrix, exists as a computed result of these first two matrices and is developed through the process detailed by Roberts et al. [4] . For purposes of the current work, this EF matrix is the format for the knowledge base that explicitly contains failure information related to functions. Within EF, In order to support a suitable knowledge base that can be applied across a wide range of product designs, the notion of a basis set of functionality that spans the functionality of a set of products is adopted for this research in the form of the functional basis formalized by Hirtz et al [24] . This language is standardized in the sense that particular verbs used to describe some functionality are explicitly defined, thus allowing the designer to use a 'standard' verb for a given functional meaning rather than perhaps using multiple synonyms which ultimately give rise to variability in functional descriptions especially if more than one designer is involved in specifying and interpreting a functional model. Standardization in this regard brings a degree of clarity to the current work that reduces the ambiguity of describing product functionality.
The vocabulary of Arunajadai et al [3] is also used to specifically address the description of failure modes.
In previous work by Roberts et al. functional models at a more detailed level. This enhanced knowledge base is used in this paper for the case studies.
Related Research: The Concept Generator Method
The research of Strawbridge et al. [6] is also prominently used in this research. Their configuring, and embodying these candidate solutions is left to the designer. Figure 1 illustrates the matrix multiplication process. In this paper, we integrate the concept generator into the FFDM to aid the designer in deriving physical solutions. 
POPULATING THE FUNCTION-FAILURE KNOWLEDGE BASE
In this research, we use failure information for the Bell 206 rotorcraft to populate an initial knowledge base. Previous work has utilized the same failure data [4] . However, in this research we have reevaluated the failure data in greater detail to derive a more robust knowledge base for use in the FFDM. In particular, the component space has been increased to include the airframe, fuel system and rotor systems, in addition to the four systems investigated by Roberts et al [4] . NTSB accident reports were again used to allow for actual failure occurrence data to populate the component-failure matrix. Various rotorcraft maintenance manuals and engineering judgment were used to derive detailed functional models of each component, therefore attaining the overall rotorcraft function-component (EC) matrix. Within these 7 systems, 41 components have been enumerated, with 25 of these components exhibiting 12 a definable failure mode. A total of 63 failures were extracted from the NTSB reports to have occurred in these 25 components. Of these 63 failures, there were 15 unique failure modes within the vocabulary of Arunajadai et al. [3] . These unique failure modes are shown as grey entries in the complete listing of possible failure modes seen in Table 2 The final EF (function-failure) result is then obtained by multiplying EC by CF for the rotorcraft. Table 4 illustrates the EF for the rotorcraft where the matrix entries indicate the number of instances in the rotorcraft system where a given function is related to the corresponding failure.
This particular E F forms the basis for the function-failure knowledge base we use in determining the potential failure modes with the FFDM in the design examples presented in following sections. 
A METHODOLOGY FOR FAILURE ANALYSIS IN CONCEPTUAL DESIGN
Pahl and Beitz [25] state that the quality of a product has to be built-in from the beginning of the design process and maintained throughout the production process. They go on to state that up to 80% of all faults can be traced back to insufficient planning and design work. Knowing this, it is hypothesized here that beginning failure analysis during conceptual design will have a positive impact on the quality of the product being designed. The major problem with this desire is the difficulty in performing failure analysis on a product that has yet to be designed and only exists as a functional representation. The development of the FFDM addresses this problem so that failure analysis can be performed at a truly conceptual stage.
The goal of the FFDM is to improve on previous failure analysis tools so that it can be applicable even in conceptual design. The FFDM is structured as a systematic technique that is easy to use. The FFDM also offers the benefit of requiring few people to perform the analysis since the method is based on archived failure occurrence information rather than human recollection. The FFDM's utilization of functional models of a design allow it to be used in conceptual design since functional models are independent of the physical form of the product being analyzed.
In addition to its failure analysis capabilities, the FFDM offers the ability to be used as a "start-to-finish" design method in conjunction with the concept generator approach or be used with more traditional concept generation approaches as a stand-alone failure analysis tool. In either case, the main purpose of FFDM is to identify failures. Naturally, the designer must balance the use of this or other failure analysis tool with the need to satisfy functional requirements and adhere to design constraints. During redesign, the FFDM can be applied when exploring the existing product at the component level. Each of these applications of the FFDM requires the use of a function-failure knowledge base to convey the relationship between past failures and functionality. 
Using FFDM for Design
The FFDM procedure is shown in Figure 2 . Specifically, the steps of the method are described below. Accounting for these initially identified failure modes generally involves adding functions to those that describe the desired functionality of the design. For the case of a black box function 'guide rotational energy' as shown in Figure 3 , the three most common failure modes have historically been high-cycle fatigue,
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galling and seizure and thermal shock. This is indicated by the entries in the function-failure matrix that are relatively high for these particular failure modes.
To address thermal shock, the designer might add functionality to the detailed functional model in order to shield the component from external heat and dissipate the heat generated by the component. By this action, the designer arrives at a more accurate functional model earlier in the design stage.
Nevertheless, this added functionality itself is a point of failure and is evaluated in the following steps. At any point during these design steps, the designer can query the function-failure knowledge base with functions from the detailed functional model in order to better understand failures that are likely to occur in the new design. Similarly, assessments can be performed as a concept evolves so that potential failure issues can be addressed.
METHOD EVALUATION
Two components comprise the evaluation of the FFDM. First, the method is evaluated in broad terms in order to provide a cursory overview of method capability. This amounts to assessing the method by direct observation and contemplation of the method in terms of method features and benefits. Second, a more thorough assessment is performed by applying the Validation Square approach developed by Penderson et al [26] .
Direct Assessment of FFDM and Case Studies
In conjunction with the overview presented in Table 1 This knowledge does come with fundamental limitations. First, the recommended failure modes are treated as independent events since the knowledge base does not account for the coupling effects between failures of multiple components and functions. Interaction effects are addressed in other work where similarity matrices are used to deal with failure interactions by allowing the FFDM to identify failures that tend to occur together [2, 7] . Second, the designer must still judge the indicated failure modes in order to recommend some action.
The second main feature of FFDM is the ability to use the approach during the functional stage of conceptual design because failures are linked to functions via matrix manipulation. The language of the functional basis and the failure mode vocabulary both contribute to this capability by providing a well-defined set of nomenclature used in the method. Due to the nature of the particular functional language used, a broad set of products can be modeled [24] . Beyond this, the failure mode vocabulary also has applications in FMEA and other techniques where such a vocabulary is appropriate. A more extensive failure mode vocabulary (including polymers, electrical applications, etc.) will allow the FFDM to be applied to a wider range of components and systems, with particular application to spacecraft anomalies, and is currently under development [5, 27] . 
Failure Analysis Comparison for a New Design
For the new design case, a design problem is formulated that is compatible with the information in the knowledge base of rotorcraft data. Specifically, this comparison is based on the design of a highly portable, small-scale air compressor that can be attached to a hand-held power drill. The design challenge is that this compressor should work with all hand-held power drills and be capable of blowing small debris away in order to clean an area such as a workbench. Two test groups are formed where the FMEA set is comprised of multiple but individually acting design engineers while a single design engineer, independent of the FMEA team, performs the FFDM analysis. Each is given the same basic statement for the design problem noted above as well as an initial design representation described below. The intent of this approach is to yield a first order estimate of the differences between the two different failure approaches. Further rigor would necessitate a greater sample set of designers and an experimental approach that accounts for designer expertise, collaborative efforts, and a large number of other complicating factors. These sources of error are taken into account in the validation discussion that follows the case studies.
Since traditional FMEA methods are not easily applicable to transforming functional representations into physical designs, an initial design representation must be established before an FMEA can be performed. The initial physical design of the air compressor, seen in Figure 4 was created using the concept generator approach of the FFDM. 1 The reader must note that this initial physical design is, for purposes of the failure analysis, independent of the FFDM.
That is to say, the concept generator is simply one source for deriving an initial physical solution. For this example, the initial physical representation developed by the concept generator does not include any additional functionality identified by assessing the failure modes of the black-box function (as prescribed in Steps 2 and 3 from above). The functional model used as input to the concept generator is based solely on identifying the chains of subfunctions that satisfy the customer needs. The air compressor physical design shown in Figure 4 is subjected to an FMEA and failure analysis within the FFDM. Output from the analyses is ultimately a set of recommended actions for completing the design of the air compressor where these recommended actions from both methods are compared in Table 5 .
1 Note-This step would normally not occur when performing the FFDM, it is included here to offer a design on which the FMEA can be performed. In the actual FFDM, the first physical model would already exhibit functionality and/or componentry to address possible failure modes. In this case, the initial physical design does not address any possible failure modes. 
Comparing Results for the Compressor Design
It should be noted that the recommended actions for this new design example from both the FMEA and the FFDM provided insightful directions for component design. The FFDM recommendations are greater in number which might be explained by the FMEA group recognizing only more realistic failures while the FFDM approach yielded a greater and perhaps excessively large set. As an alternative interpretation, the FFDM has a knowledge base with a more complete set of potential failures than the expertise afforded by the FMEA group.
In particular, the thermal consequences of this design were overlooked or at least not acknowledged by the FMEA test subjects, but investigated by the FFDM. It is possible that at the time of the analysis, the FMEA test subjects each made a deliberate choice to ignore these issues since limited time dictates that not all failure modes be addressed. By comparison, the recommendations from the FFDM approach show considerable overlap with the FMEA results.
Failure Analysis Comparison for an Existing Product
For this comparison, three components from a Campbell Hausfeld 1/2" air impact wrench are analyzed using both FMEA and the FFDM. An exploded view of the impact wrench is shown in Figure 6 . 
Results for the Anvil
The anvil's main functionality is to export both rotational and impact energy from the wrench. Within the casing, the anvil interacts with the hammer, and externally, the anvil attaches to a socket. The socket would then link the impact wrench to the nut or bolt that is being turned. The comparison in Table 6 shows that the recommended actions resulting from both failure analysis methods are quite similar. The FFDM did however identify a somewhat larger list of recommended actions. Recommendations for stress and fatigue analysis were recommended by FFDM but not by FMEA and in general, the FMEA recommendations seem to be aimed more at manufacturing and maintenance than up-front design. 
Results for Inlet Bushing
The inlet bushing's main functionality is to import compressed air into the impact wrench from an external source. The bushing threads into the wrench housing and is held in place with a thread-locking compound. Either a compressed air hose or "quick-connect" fitting is threaded into the internal diameter of the bushing. A wire screen filter is present within the bushing to filter any solid debris out of the incoming air. The comparison in Table 7 shows the recommended actions from both methods to be similar. The FFDM does not account for "clogging" of the screen filter. Currently, the failure mode vocabulary does not describe "clogging" accurately since a "clog" usually indicates the failure of some other component. For example a part might clog because it fills substantially with metal chips dislodged from a bearing that is according to some established definition, clearly galling. The vocabulary used for the failure modes defines the term for a given failure mode so that ambiguity for failure 29 terms is minimized. This applies to both FFDM and FMEA since test subjects used the same vocabulary for both approaches. In the case of the bearing, it would be said to fail via galling and seizure and this would be entered into the knowledge base as such. The cumulative set of multiple failures leading to this seizure are not captured however. 
Results for Housing Back Plate
The housing back plate is bolted to the rear of the impact wrench and supports the internal rotating components while also acting as a manifold to distribute the compressed air. Table 8 shows some overlap with the thread-locking solution recommended in both analyses.
The suggestion for a self-cleaning filter seems to be an innovative solution not accounted for in the FFDM. For both types of analysis, the emphasis of recommended actions seems to be on manufacturing quality assurance rather than pre-production design effort. 
Comparing Results for the Impact Wrench Redesign
For these three components of the impact wrench, the results from the FFDM again suggest performing more analyses than the FMEA approach. With respect to the clogged filter issue, it should be noted that clogging is not a recognized failure mode within the vocabulary that has been used for this research. The same argument applies to the FMEA method since the students using the FMEA technique in these experiments used the same knowledge base which therefore has the same vocabulary. Expansion of the failure mode vocabulary is a key area for concentrating further research in order to more precisely capture a broader set of failures. This improvement could impact both FFDM and FMEA approaches.
VALIDATION SQUARE ASSESSMENT
The Validation Square [26] is used as a six step framework here for progressively evaluating the FFDM. The first step involves addressing the validity of the individual constructs that form the FFDM. In this case, the major constitutive items include the terms for specifying functions, components, and failure modes as well as the structures in which these terms are manipulated. The functional language used is valid based on its well-defined nature [24] . The terms used for components and failure modes are valid based on the clarity observed in the initial knowledge base established above. The structures for these terms are simply matrices that explicitly relate these terms together so their validity is not a concern.
The second step is to validate method consistency in order to ensure that the method process is workable by having adequate information throughout its process. This step also determines if the information generated is excessive, unnecessary, invalid, or insufficient. The limitation of the FFDM in this regard is the knowledge base. The FFDM is only as adequate as the set of failures archived in the CF matrix which means that potentially, the method will not be indicate all relevant failures. As the size of the knowledge base grows, this limitation is reduced. Conversely, this larger size may produce a greater number of false positives in the sense that more potential failures may be indicated than are really necessary. Pruning this oversized failure set then becomes an issue. These difficulties notwithstanding, the method is workable and assuming the knowledge base is developed without error, the method is a feasible process. As a third step, the Validation Square addresses example problems used to test the method. Validation at this stage is simply the acceptance of the examples as appropriate for verifying method performance. The above case studies both use reasonable products that are representative of the type of devices for which failure analysis techniques are intended. Based on this consideration, the examples support acceptance of the third validation step.
The fourth step is intended to verify the utility of the method for the example problems.
Here the issue is whether or not users of the method showed benefit relative to some reference.
From this perspective, the results are encouraging. In both case studies, the FFDM resulted in a greater number of recommended actions. Anecdotally, this seems positive although some of the recommendations are admittedly low probability events. Nevertheless, the greater coverage of potential failures is taken as a positive result. Figure 7 gives an overview of the recommended actions from both case studies in terms of the number of overlapped recommendations as well as the recommendations unique to the FFDM and the FMEA methods. The case study involving the compressor resulted in much greater overlap than the recommendations for the impact wrench. Reasons for this effect are unclear although one partial explanation is that the FMEA test subjects scaled the number of their recommended actions to be proportionate to the scale of the design problem under investigation. Here the compressor is clearly more complex than the individual problems of the anvil, inlet bushing, and back plate. Again, this explanation is speculative but supported by the results. Figure 7 also shows that while the FFDM presents a greater number of recommended actions, the FMEA approach consistently produces one unique recommendation. The fact that this greater coverage was obtained using one designer compared to the three engineers performing FMEA is particularly encouraging and suggests that the results can be attributed to the usefulness of the results to the method. These combined results support the validation of the FFDM for both the fourth and fifth steps. While multiple case studies across several designers would improve the confidence of the results, the results although limited do support the conclusion that FFDM is relatively effective at recommending a set of failure modes compared to the FMEA approach. Extrapolating this inference beyond the two case studies to other products is the test for the sixth and final validation step. Given the nature of the products in the above examples in that they are in the mainstream of mechanical products for which FFDM is intended, it is reasonable to conclude that the FFDM approach would be effective as well for other products at a similar level of complexity and scale.
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER WORK
Revisiting the case of the failed electric transformers from the introduction, the cracks found at the base of the cooling fins originated because of high cycle fatigue. Since transformers operate under static conditions, fatigue had not been considered in the original design selection.
But, during their shipment on rail cars, vibrations caused a situation of fatigue to develop at the locations where the fins were welded to the transformer case. As reported, these cracks caused the failure of the transformer coils [1] .
While this incident is not directly related to the operational aspects of the product, the Further research is underway to improve upon the failure mode vocabulary of Arunajadai et al. [3] to include electrical failures and improve the failure definitions concerning composite materials and polymers [27] . These additions to the failure mode vocabulary will allow the knowledge base to be expanded to include components that exhibit these failures.
At this point, the rotorcraft function-failure knowledge base is the only one that has been developed and tested in a limited manner. It will be necessary to develop other function-failure knowledge bases or add to the existing one in order archive historical failure occurrence knowledge from other areas such as consumer products and the automotive industry. JPL's space missions are currently under study to derive component functionality and extract failure mode information from the existing Problem and Failure Reporting database [5] . The expansion of the function-failure knowledge bases will logically occur after the failure mode vocabulary has been increased.
